## 5 April 1963

	25X1C
X1 X1C	2. Apparently the Lunik shot is going to pass close to the moon and not impact. It is not clear at this time whether it will orbit around the moon or be a miss. Mr. McCone indicated that there was high level concern about the U.S. manned lunar program and requested Mr. Kent to look at the estimate in light of the most recent shot. He also request GMAIC (later changed to OSI) to present information on what could be accomplished by instrumentation on the moon and what could be accomplished by having an actual man there.  3. OCI referred to a cable from Galbraith relative to U.S. activities.  I informed the DCI that we had, the previous evening, sen
	McCloy has been asked to review our disarmament policies and, particularly, the status of our test ban negotiations. DCI indicated that he had given his personal views to the President that our present position want too far in terms of safeguards and that he felt an agreement would not be particularly useful relative to the nth country problem since the Sovi have no control over China and  President was inclined to agree but felt that we should continue to negotiate, although he wasn't very sanguine about any success.
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25X6

Approved For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP66R00546R000100100201-1 25X1A 5. There is considerable concern about the subversive threat to Thatland. Apparently different reporters give different versions of the seriousness of the situation. DD/I has already prepared a briefing paper for the Director on the subject, but they were asked to look at it again in the light of any possible new information. This should be kept in mind as background in the event of DCI reported on Special Group and deferment of Laos flight consideration until next week (see HS Memo for the Record). DCI directed that we prepare a flight plan for Laos and review with Harriman prior to the meeting. Action: OSA 7. General Carter raised the question relative to He indicated this presented serious security problems. DCI wished to review the directive. 25X1A I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART program, and on the NRO funding program. The DCI indicated that McNamara had a directive from the President to prepare a contingency plan in the event that U-2s could no longer operate over Cuba. I stated that NRO had been given action on this and we were preparing a report.

25X1

25X6

9. The DCI also briefed the President on the OXCART program. The President is very much interested in the supersonic transport, which was discussed with Kelly by the DCI on his visit. Kelly had indicated 25X1A the cost of per aircraft on an order of 100. The President was not startled by this number, even though it is considerably higher than other estimates. He pointed out that there are many other costs than just the aircraft costs in a \$5T program.

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